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[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration. 
The evidence need not eonoborate an accomplice as to every 
fact to which he testifies, but is suffieient if it does not 
interpretation and direction from the testimony of the accom-
plice yet tends to connect defendant with the commission of 
the offpnse in sueh a way as rPasonably may a ;jury 
that the accomplice is tt>lling the truth; it must tend to impli-
cate defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact 
which is an element of the crime, but it is not necessary that 
the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish 
every element of the offense charged. 
[2] Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge.-Pos-
session of stolen property, accompanied by no explanntion or 
an tmsatisfactory explanation of the possession or by sus-
picious cireumstances, will justify an inference that the goods 
were received with knowledge that they had been stolen; the 
rule is generally applied where the accused is found in posses-
sion of the articles soon after they were stolen. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 499; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1235 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Receiving Stol&n Goods, § 8; Am.Jur., Receiving 
Stolen Property, § 7. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 577(1); [2] Receiv-
ing Stolen Goods, § 9(4); [3, 5] Receiving Stolen Goods, § 7(4); 
[4] Receiving Stolen Goods, §§ 7(4), 7(5); [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1335; [7, 41] Receiving Stolen Goods, § 9; [8] Criminal Law, 
§ 658(1); [9, 10] Criminal Law,§ 141; [11] Criminal Law,§ 1084: 
[12] Criminal Law, §§ 1092, 1409; [13] Criminal Law, § 1407; [14] 
Criminal La.w, § 1403; [15, 17, 18] Criminal Law, § 621; [16] Crimi-
nal La.w, § 1407(6); [19] Criminal Law,§ 1404(11); [20] Crimina.! 
La.w, § 104; [21] Criminal Law, §51; [22] Criminal Law, § 424: 
[23] Criminal Law, § 1363; [24] Criminal La.w, § 1217; [25, 26] 
Criminal Law,§ 589; [27] Criminal Law, § 793; [28] Criminal Law, 
§682; [29] Criminal Law, §721; [30] Criminal Law, ~828; [31] 
Criminal Law,~ 14cW(!l); [32] Criminal Law,§ 564(2); [33] Crimi-
nal Law, §34:i; [34] .Jnry, §80; [:35] Criminnl Law, ~2!H; [36J 
Receiving Stolen Good~, §0(1); [:l7J Receiving Stolen Goods, 
~ 7(3); [B8] Criminal Law, § 970(4); [il9] Criminal Law, § 952 
(2); [40] Receiving Stolen Goods, §§ 7(il), 8. 
*Reporter's N otc: This case was previously entitled '' I'coplc v. 
Ferguson.'' 
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[3] !d.-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge .. ~F'alse or evasive answers 
to material with referenee to of stolen 
property tend to prove knowledge that it was stolen. 
[4] Id -Evidence- Guilty Knowledge: Corroboration.-In a 
pro~w:ution for reeeiving a stoh•n wat,•IJ, wlwre defendant 
tedif1ed that he •·m11e into posst>ssion of th<' wat,·h the night 
before his :urC'st, the jnry eould Jlnd that dd'P!Hlant's Rtate. 
ment to a polit:e oftit-er, shortly after his anest, that the 
wateh "\\"as his, that he lwd lwd it for smne time,'' was a 
eonseiously evasive awl misleading explnnation; this was suffi. 
cient to show a eousciousness of guilt .and justify an inferencP 
that dd'endnnt n·e<?ived the wateh with knowl(•dge that it was 
stolen, and snell evidem·e tends to comwet defendant with the 
connnission of" the off,•use and satisfws the requirement that 
areomplice tPstimony be eorroboratPd. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) 
[5] !d.-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge.-Denial of possession of 
stolen goods, if sueh denial is shown to be false, is a persuasive 
circumstance tending to show guilty knowledge. 
[6] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Accom-
plices and Corroboration.-\Vh~n it is discovered that there 
is testimony, aside from that of an accomplice, which tends 
to connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged, 
the function of the reviewing court is performed, since ques-
tions of ~weight of e.-idence and credibility of witnesses are for 
the trier of fact. 
[7] Receiving Stolen Goods-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, uncertainties in the 
thief's testimony as to just when defendant was present when 
the thief delivered stolen property to an accomplice are for 
determination by the trier of fact, not the reviewing court. 
[8] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Credibility of 
Witnesses.-An nppraisal of the effeet of a change in a police 
offieer's testimony, made on rebuttal after he had discussed 
his testimony with another officer in alleged violation of the 
f'ourt's order sequestering witnesses, was for the trier of fact. 
[9] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-An acquittal of 
conspiracy to commit a crime is no bar to a subsequent prose-
cution for commission of the erime itself, though such crime is 
alleg·ed in the conspiracy indictment as the sole overt act. 
[10] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-An acquittal 
of conspiracy to commit burglary :md to receive stolen prop-
erty is not incomistent with conviction of substantive offenses 
of receiving stolen goods, since defendant could be guilty of 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 179 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crimi-
nal Law, §§ 381, 390. 
them. 
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stolen goods without having conspired to receive 
[11] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Exclusion of Evidence and Offer.-
Where a question does not show on its face whether it is 
material, the questioner, in order to claim error in sustaining 
an objection thereto, must reframe it or make offer of proof 
to show its materiality. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attor-
ney: Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-
Generally, where no objection is made to misconduct of the 
prosecuting attorney, or where objection is made and the court 
sustains the objection and properly admonishes the jury, the 
misconduct claimed to be prejudicial to defendant's rights 
will not furnish grounds sufficient to justify the granting 
of a new trial or reversal of the judgment. 
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-Where a case is closely balanced and 
acts of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney are such as to 
contribute materially to the verdict, or where the act done 
or remark made is of such character that a harmful result 
cannot be cured by any retraction or instruction, the mis-
conduct will furnish ground for reversal even where proper 
admonitions are given. 
[14] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct 
of Prosecuting Attorney.-Whether a prosecutor was guilty 
of prejudicial misconduct must be determined in the light of 
the particular factual situation involved. 
[15] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Statements in Retaliation.-
Where defense counsel in a prosecution for receiving stolen 
property made implications that an attorney other than de-
fendant should have been prosecuted, the prosecutor's remarks 
that "it is not the function of the District Attorney's office to 
go around recklessly indicting people and bringing charges 
against them. Our duties are not to prosecute people just for 
the sake of making prosecutions" fell within the scope of 
proper argument as an answer to such implications and con-
stituted an attempt to clarify for the jury matters which might 
have confused them; any inference to the effect that the prose-
cutor had extrajudicial knowledge of defendant's guilt was 
slight and was susceptible to cure by admonition. 
[16] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for conspiracy and 
for receiving stolen property, where the prosecutor in his 
argument to the jury stated that there was the insinuation 
that all of the People's witnesses who were accomplices or 
connected with defendant were allowed to plead guilty to 
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one or two of several counts, his remarks that 
"If we took a of two Counts and one 
Count the we will offer 
same at any time during this 
trial he wanted to plead guilty to one Count, or if he would like 
to do so even now, we will give him the same eonsideration," 
were eured by the court's admonition that the disregard 
the statement any offer to accept a plea from 
defendant. 
!d.-Argument of Counsel-statements in Betaliation.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, remarks by the 
Pl'"'"'""'vL in his argument to the jury that the reason 
some of the stolen jewelry or fur coats were not in 
was that the State could not show defendant's connec-
tion with them did not imply that the prosecutor had personal 
knowledge of defendant's guilt but were, in view of the fact 
that defense counsel had earlier called the jury's attention to 
the fact that certain items referred to in the testimony had 
not been introduced into evidence, a legitimate explanation 
to the jury why such items had not been introduced, and even 
assuming that the remarks were improper their substance 
could not be said to have contributed materially to the verdict. 
[18] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Statements in Betaliation.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, remarks o£ the 
prosecutor in his argument to the jury that "it is evident . • • 
that if anyone would have been given consideration by the 
Police Department, it would have been the son of a former 
policeman. They would not discriminate against a policeman's 
son," did not amount to an avowal of his personal belie£ in 
defendant's guilt, but were made in answer to defense coun-
sel's earlier assertions that defendant incurred the wrath of 
the police department by bringing several suits against its 
members and the police were out to "settle" defendant "once 
and for all." 
[19] Id.-Appeal-Rarmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen 
property, the prosecutor's conduct in twice referring to defend-
ant as the "mouthpiece" for his accomplices, though improper, 
was not ground for reversal where it did not appear that any 
different verdict would have been probable had the prosecutor 
not used the term. 
[20] !d.-Bights of Accused-Fair 'l'rial.-In a prosecution for 
receiving stolen property, defendant's claim that he was denied 
a fair trial in that the district attorney and the court coerced 
accomplices to testify untruthfully against him was not sub-
stantiated where it appeared that the accomplices pleaded 
guilty to certain charges brought against them and that the 
Apr. 1958] PEOPLE v. LYONS 
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court postponed their ~entencing from time to time until after 
they had testified for the prosecution against defendant, and 
where the prosecutor frankly admitted to the jury that "in-
ducements" (obviously promises of reduced sentences) had 
been offered, these facts going to the credibility, not the 
competency, of such testimony. 
[21] !d.-Immunity to One Furnishing Evidence.-The fact that 
promises of leniency were conditioned on accomplices' first 
testifying against defendant does not render such testimony 
worthless as a matter of law or so inherently incredible as to 
result in incompetency where there is nothing to indicate that 
such promises were conditioned on anything other than the 
accomplices' testifying fully and fairly as to their knowledge 
of the facts out of which the charges arose; the court's failure 
to sentence the accomplices until after they testified was not 
so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. 
[22] !d.-Evidence-Explanation For Failure to Produce Witness. 
-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, it was not 
error to admit testimony of a process server that he twice 
served a subpoena on the person in whose hotel room defend-
nut was arrested, and that he again attempted to serve him 
but could not find him, wh('re such hotel roomer did not appear 
at the trial, where the prosecuting attorney in argument said 
that he "would like to have had [the roomer] here ... to clear 
up some of the inconsistencies in the defendant's story," and 
where, though there was no showing that the roomer's testi-
mony would have been favorable to the prosecution, the 
prosecution was entitled to explain why he was not produced, 
to forestall any question which might arise in the minds of the 
jury as to why he did not testify. 
[23] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Trial-Rebuttal.-In a prose-
cution for receiving stolen property, alleged error in per-
mitting the questioning of an officer in rebuttal by reading 
from a transcript portions of a conversation at which he, other 
officers, a hotel roomer and defendant were present, and 
asking the officer whether the conversation occurred, did not 
constitute ground for reversal where, though the questioning 
was somewhat confusing and the so-called rebuttal was not 
strictly rebuttal, defendant could not have been prejudiced in 
this regard. 
[24] Id.- Appeal- Record-Amendment and Correction.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, defendant could not 
successfully complain that the transcript was altered where 
there was nothing in the record to show that the transcript 
was not altered to correct it so that it would reflect the truth. 
[25] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Suppression of Evidence.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, where an accom-
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plice testified that he receiver a certain sum 
for which the receiver obtained a driver's license for the 
accomplice under a fictitious name and that the accomplice 
believed defendant was present during some of the conversa-
tions which led to the obtaining of the false license, which was 
received in evidence at defendant's request but marked as a 
People's exhibit, where defendant called an officer to the stand 
and he answered negatively questions whether he had caused 
an examination of the thumb print and signature on the 
license to be made and whether he had any idea whose thumb 
print and handwriting app€wred thereon, and where to the 
question, "And as you sit there now you have no idea who 
wrote on that application "I" to which the officer testified, "No, 
I don't," whereupon the prosecuting attorney made an objec-
tion, stating "We all have an idea after listening to the 
evidence," the People did not suppress evidence that the 
thumb print was not that of defendant and no such implication 
appeared from the prosecuting attorney's quoted statement; 
rather, "after listening to the evidence," it appeared that the 
originnl receiver obtnined the license for the accomplice on 
application of an unidentified person who answered the accom-
plice's general description. 
[26] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Suppression of Evidence.-In a 
prosecution for receiving stolen property, where an officer 
testified that when defendant was questioned about a stolen 
watch he "said it was his, that he had had it for some time," 
but defendant testified that he did not make such statement, 
and where on defense counsel's cross-examinntion of the officer 
he testified that the interrogation of defendant was recorded 
but that he did not have a transcript of the conversation 
concerning the watch, defendant could not successfully assert 
that this portion of the conversation was recorded and the 
recording suppressed, it appearing that, though the conversa-
tion occurred immediately after defendant was taken to the 
office of the police, it may have been that the recording of 
defendant's questioning had not commenced. 
[27] Id.-Instructions-Presumptions.-In a prosecution for re-
ceiving stolen property, defendant could not successfully com-
plain that the jury were not instructed that private transactions 
are presumed to be fair and regular (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, 
subd. 19), and that the court gave no instruction embodying 
the principle that a defendant is presumed to speak the truth, 
where defendant did not request such instructions, and where, 
though there was no instruction specifically directed to defend-
ant's explanation of events as opposed to that of any other 
witness, the court instructed the jury at length concerning 
the appraisal of the credibility of witnesses, and among other 
things the jury were told that a witness is presumed to speak 
PEOPLE V. LYONS 
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the truth and that such presumption may be repelled by the 
manner in which he testifies, his interest in the case, his bias 
or prejudice for or against any of the parties, the character of 
his testimony, or contradictory evidence. 
[28] !d.-Invasion by Court of Province of Jury-Singling Out 
Witnesses.-It is improper for the court to single out a par-
ticular witness and charge the jury how his evidence should 
be considered. 
[29] !d.-Instructions-Refusal of Requests Covered by Other 
Instructions.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, 
defendant could not successfully complain that the court re-
fused his requested instruction that "The fact that an indict-
ment has been filed ... is not to be considered by you ... on 
the proposition of the guilt or innocence of this defendant" 
and that the plea of not guilty raises the presumption of inno-
cence, where this instruction was covered by other, more 
accurate instructions. 
(30] !d.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-In a prosecu-
tion for receiving stolen property, defendant could not suc-
cessfully complain of the refusal of a requested instruction 
that the testimony of an alleged coconspirator should be 
examined with great care in case he had been tendered im-
munity from prosecution in reward for his State's evidence 
ag·ainst his alleged colleague, where the substance was covered 
in other instructions. 
[3la, 31b] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instruc-
tions.--Failure to instmct that proof independent of extra-
judicial stateutents of dt>f<>ndant is rwcessary to prove the 
corpus ddieti, though enor, was not reversible under the cir-
<·mnstnnces in a prosecution for reeeiving stolen property. 
[32] !d.-Evidence-Corpus Delicti.-Uncorroborated testimony of 
accomplices is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. 
[33] !d.-Taking Articles to Jury Room.-Assuming that exhibits, 
including allegedly stolen property, were taken into the jury 
room by "armed guards" without request by the jury, such 
conduct WHs not error where it did not appear that such eon-
duct could exert any improper influence on the jury or in-
flu<>nce them to believe that the ass<>rtedly stolen exhibits 
wt>re in fact stolen. 
[34] Jury-Objections.-A defendant has no right to complain 
that the number of challenges to the jury was limited by 
denial of his motion for severance of his trial from that of 
his codefendant where there is no showing that he exhausted 
his peremptory ehalleng<>s, since he was not prejudiced in this 
regard. 
[35] Criminal Law-Separate Trials of Defendants Jointly Ac-
cused.-The fact that a defendant charged with conspiracy 
252 PEOPLE v. LYONS [50 C.2d 
to commit burglary and who was the actual burglar sat at the 
defense end of the counsel table before testifying against 
another defendant accused of receiving the stolen property 
did not furnish good reason for granting the second defend-
ant's motion for severance of his trial from that of the first 
defendant, and he was not prejudiced thereby since, if both 
had been tried separately, the first defendant could have 
testified against the second. 
[36] Receiving Stolen Goods-Indictment and Information-Proof 
and Variance.--~Th<•re was no varianee between a dwt'ge of 
receiving· stoletl property and aliPged proof that defendant 
was guilty of burglary as a conspirator, under the theory that 
he could not commit the crime of receiving stolen property 
from himself, where defendant was found not guilty of con-
spiracy to commit burglary and to receive stolen goods; 
defendant could be found guilty as a receiver not pursuant 
to a prearranged plan but as a transaction independent of the 
burglary. 
[37] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices.---Assuming that defendant and 
accomplices agreed in advance that the accomplices should 
steal property and defendant would receive it, the legal effect 
of such conspiracy would not be to exonerate any of its 
participants from any crime committed pursuant to the agree-
ment, but rather would support a holding that all were accom-
plices in the offense or offenses resulting from execution of 
such plan. 
[38] Criminal Law-New Trial-Discretion of Court-Newly Dis-
covered Evidence.-On a motion for new trial, where conflict-
ing affidavits are filed, the question of fact is for determination 
of the trial judge whose finding will not be disturbed on appeal 
if there is substantial evidence to sustain it. 
[39] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence-Character of 
Evidence.-It was not improper to deny a new trial for newly 
discovered evidence where it was not reasonably probable that 
the evidence, cumulative and impeaching, would have caused 
the jury to reach a different conclusion regarding defendant's 
guilt. 
[40] Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence: Sentence on Conviction 
on Different Counts.-Evidence that defendant originally re-
ceived a stolen watch and fur coat on a single occasion showed 
but one offense of receiving stolen property, though the goods 
were stolen from different sources, and the duality of two 
separate sentences on convictions on different counts, though 
the sentences are ordered to run concurrently, cannot be per-
mitted to stand. 
[41] !d.-Appeal-Disposition of Cause.-Where it was improper 
to impose separate sentences (to run concurrently) on convic-
Apr.1958] PEOPLE v. LYONS 
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tion of receiving a stolen watch and fur coat on different 
counts because both articles were received by defendant on a 
single occasion, and where neither the State nor defendant 
would be prejudiced by a simple reversal as to one count and 
affirmance as to the other, this procedure should be followed 
as more desirable than that of reversing the judgments as to 
both eounts, ordering such counts consolidated, and remanding 
the cause for rearraignment of defendant for sentence and for 
sentence on the consolidated count. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Walter R Evans, ,Judge.* ,T udgment affirmed in part and 
reversed in part; order affirmed. 
Prosecution for receiving stolen property. Judgment of 
conviction based on one count affirmed, and based on another 
count reversed. 
Hiehard II. Cantillon, under appointment by the District 
Court of Appeal, Cantillon & Cantillon, R Michael Cantillon 
and JameB P. Cantillon for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and 
William B. James, Deputy Attorneys General, S. Ernest Roll, 
District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Fred 
N. \Vhichello, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
SCHAUEH, J.-Lowell Lyo~1s (hereinafter called defend-
ant), Paul Ferguson, and James Pope were charged by indict-
ment (count 1) with conspiracy to commit burglary and to 
receive stolen property; defendant and Ferguson were fur-
ther eharged (counts 2 through 6) with five counts of reeeiv-
ing stolen property. Ferguson pleaded guilty as charged 
in count 2 and his cause was referred to the probation depart-
ment for a report; his only appearance at the trial was as 
a witness for the prosecution. Pope and defendant pleaded 
not guilty. Pope went to trial with defendant but during 
the trial the one count against him (eonspiracy) was dis-
missed on the People's motion and he was called as a witness 
for the prosecution. 
A jury found defendant 110t guilty under counts 1, 2, and 
:~ and guilty as d1arged in eouuts 5 (receiving a stolen wateh, 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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the property of Aaron Rothenberg) and 6 (receiving a 
stolen fur coat, the property of Donald Thomas Handy). t 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms in the state 
prison. He presents numerous assignments of error, includ-
ing the contention that there is insufficient evidence to cor-
roborate the testimony of accomplice-witnesses. For the rea-
sons hereinafter stated we have concluded that the matters 
complained of by defendant, subsequently detailed, either are 
not error or, in the circumstances, did not result in a mis-
carriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%), except that 
defendant should have been sentenced for only one count of 
receiving stolen goods. 
Ferguson, Pope, and Dann Rio, witnesses for the prosecu-
tion, were accomplices aecording to a possible view of their 
own testimony. The jury were instructed that if the crimes 
charged were committed by anyone, then these witnesses were 
accomplices as a matter of law and that the testimony of 
an accomplice is to be viewed with distrust and must be 
corroborated. 
To show that there is inculpatory evidence apart from the 
testimony of the accomplices we first set forth a summary 
of such inculpatory evidence. Defendant himself testified 
as follows: He was a lawyer with practice largely in the 
field of criminal law. He represented Ferguson, who was 
charged in a federal case with conspiracy. On a number of 
occasions defendant accompanied Ferguson in the latter's 
car; on such occasions defendant would drive because he 
knew that Ferguson "was an ex-convict and couldn't drive 
an automobile legally." Through Ferguson defendant met 
James Pope under the alias of James England. Through 
''England'' defendant met Dann Rio and undertook to repre-
sent Rio in a narcotics case. Rio gave defendant $100 as a 
retainer. Subsequently Rio informed defendant that he was 
unable to raise the additional fee and, according to defend-
ant's testimony at the trial, on the night of April 7, 1955 (the 
night before defendant's arrest), Rio "handed me that watch 
[the subject of count 5] and told me it ought to be worth 
$50.00 off the fee ... and although I had a watch at the 
time I did accept that watch from Mr. Rio." Mr. Rothenberg, 
the owner of the watch, testified that it was stolen from his 
house in a burglary committed during his absence sometime 
between April 2 and April 7, 1955. Officer Hooper testified 
tCount 4 was dismissed. 
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that he questioned defendant at the eity hall shortly after 
defendant's arrest; "I asked him to remove the property 
from his pockets; he put his property on the desk; in the 
property wa,; a man's Helbros pocket watch. I asked him 
where he bad gotten this watch, be said it was his, that he 
had had it for some time.'' 
.. A.s to count 6, receiving a stolen fur coat, the corroborative 
evidence is as follows: The owner of the eoat testified that 
it was stolen on the evening of April 7, 1955. Officer Roberts 
testified that on the morning of April 8, 1955, he saw defend-
ant carrying a blue bag on which were the letters '' P AA''; 
the bag was "stuffed fulL" Defendant was accompanied by 
Perguson, who was carrying a beer carton. They entered the 
Crest HoteL "[T] hree or four minutes" after defendant 
and Perguson entered the hotel officers followed them to the 
room of one Gallo. Officer 0 'Mara testified that he and the 
other officers entered Gallo's room. Defendant "said, 'Who 
are you 'I' I said, 'I am a police officer.' And I said, 'Yon are 
under arrest.' And he said, 'What for?' And I said, 'Por 
investigation of stolen articles.' '' The beer carton was on 
the floor. On it lay a fur piece (not the subject of count 6). 
Also on the floor was the blue bag, closed. An officer opened 
it and found in it the fur coat whieh is the subject of count 
6 and three white shirts .. 
Defendant testified that at least two of the shirts were his; 
that he had put them in the automobile in which he drove 
to the Crest Hotel; and that "to my knowledge" they were 
not in Gallo's room. Officer Hooper testified that when, 
shortly after defendant's arrest, the officer questioned defend-
ant in the eity hall, "I asked Mr. Lyons about the fur coats 
that had been found in the room, he said that he hadn't seen 
any fur coats, didn't know what I was talking about." 
'l'he aeeompliee Perguson testified as follows: He met de-
fendant in November, 1954. 'l'hereafter Pope got in touch 
with Ferguson and met him about a dozen times when de-
fendant was present. On April 7, 1955, Rio, Pope, Ferguson, 
and defendant were present at a conversation when Pope 
"stated how much he would like to get from that fur coat" 
(the subjeet of count 6) ; "for the fur coat and three pieces 
of jewelry he stated he would like it to bring $200.00." The 
next morning Perguson took a fur coat in a beer carton and 
defendant took the fur coat which is the subject of count 6 
in a bag initialed '' P AA'' to Gallo's room. Gallo ''asked 
how much he was supposed to ask" for the furs; Ferguson 
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said :f;lJOO: Uallo "t,aid lw \ronld try to t!Jat mueh, he 
wouldn't kllow until he saw his parties on the other end of the 
line .... A bout that time the pol ice oflleers eame in and 
arrested us. '' 
In February, 1955, while Ferguson was in the eounty jail 
he heard of one Newton Erwin, who was also in jail ''and I had 
a sort of sympathy for the man, aHd he want<"d to make bail 
l:nd it seemed as though he didn't have any eo] lateral to make 
bail. ... I told Mr. Lyons that I thought lVIr". Erwin was a 
very nice gentleman ... , and if there was anything we 
could do to further his bond I would like to do it." At a 
subsequent conversation among Mr. Davila, a bail bond broker, 
Ferguson and Lyons, it was agreed that fur coats obtained 
from Pope would be ''put up ... as collateral for Mr. 
Erwin's bond,'' and this was done. 
Ferguson further described the sale of a fur coat, negotiated 
by Ferguson and defendant, to a Mr. Millin. 'fhe proceeds 
of the sale were turned over to Pope. 
Davila and Millin, respectively, corroborated the testimony 
of Ferguson concerning the transactions with them. 
The accomplice Pope testified as follows: On March 17, 
1955, he was introdueed to defendant by Ferguson whom 
he had known for 12 years. In defendant's presence Pope 
"stated that I had numerous articles which I wished to dis-
pose of .... Mr. Ferguson stated he could handle the matter 
for me .... I advised Paul [Ferguson] I had several furs 
and numerous small items of jewelry.'' There was not ''any 
mention made as to where these artie] es came from." On 
Mareh 18, 1955, in the presence of defendant, Pope turned 
over to Ferguson jewelry and furs. Ferguson '' Rtated that 
he was not holding . . . That is a slang expression meaning 
broke .... I stated that I would give them a good break 
on the deal,'' that is, $200. '' [I] n the course of the general 
conversation it was brought out that I was hot ... that I 
had escaped.'' There was ''general conversation'' concerning 
burglaries and Ferguson ''advised me to stay as low as pos-
sible, in view of the fact that I was an escapee, and ... keep 
the heat on myself down to a minimum.'' There was con-
versation concerning obtaining identification for Pope under 
the name of .Tames England at a cost of $50. 
At a third meeting among defendant, Pope, and Ferguson, 
Ferguson paid Pope $200; Pope handed Ferguson $50 to ob-
tain a driver's license and other identification; and Pope de-
livered jewelry and furs to Ferguson. 
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At a subsequent meeting among Ferguson, defendant, 
and Pope, Ferguson delivered to Pope a receipt for the ap-
plication fee for a driver's license. 'I' hereafter Ferguson 
delivered the license in the name "Robert Englund" to Pope. 
Thereafter Pope committed various burglaries and stole 
fnrs and jewelry and delivered some of them to Ferguson in 
the presence of defendant. He delivered stolen furs to Fer-
guson in defendant's presence on "perhaps four" occasions. 
Among the items which he stole were the subjects of counts 
5 and 6. He stole the watch and fur coat which are the 
subjects of those counts on April 7, 1955, and took them to 
Rio's apartment. Ferguson and defendant arrived and Pope 
gave defendant the watch "as an additional $25.00 fee against 
Mr. Rio's bill." 
The accomplice Dann Rio testified that on April 7, 1955, 
he, defendant, Perguson and Pope had a conversation in Rio's 
apartment ''with reference to how much money ·we wanted 
for the fur pieces . . . l W] e agreed on the sum of $200 for 
it, that and some jewelry." The fur coat which is the sub-
ject Of count 6 was put in a blue bag initialed "P AA" and 
carried from Rio's apartment; Rio did not remember who put 
the coat in the bag or who carried it from the apartment. 
The rules concerning the sufficiency of evidence to cor-
roborate the testimony of an accomplice are as follows: Sec-
tion 1111 of the Penal Code, provides, in part: ''A conviction 
cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it 
be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to con-
nect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the com-
mission of the offense or the circumstances thereof . . . " 
[1] The evidence need not corroborate the accomplice as 
to every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does 
not require interpretation and direction from the testimony 
of the accomplice yet tends to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it 
must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must 
relate to some act or fact which is an element of the crime but 
it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be suffi-
cient in itself to establish every element of the offense 
charged. (People v. Brown (1958), 49 Cal.2d 577, G83-584 
[1, 2] [320 P.2d 5]; People v. llf.acEwing (1955), 45 Cal.2d 
218, 223-225 [2, 3, 6, 7] [288 P.2d 257] ; People v. Santo 
(1954), 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [4, 7] [273 P.2d 249]; People v. 
50 C.2d-9 
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, 43 CaL2d 563 [4, 5] P.2d 31]; 
People v. Gallardo (1953), 41 CaL2d 57, 62 [5, 6] [257 P.2d 
29]; People v. Barclay (1953), 40 CaL2d 146, 156 [13a, 14] 
[252 P.2d 321].) 
Defendant does not attempt to controvert the evidence that 
the watch had been stolen and was in defendant's possession 
at the time of his arrest, but contends that there is insufficient 
corroborative evidence to show guilty knowledge that the 
watch had been stolen. [2] As stated in People v. Lopez 
(1954), 126 Cal..~:\.pp.2d 274, 278 [4] [271 P.2d 874], "[P]os-
session of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation, 
or an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession, or by 
suspicions circumstances, will justify an inference that 
the goods were received with knowledge that they had been 
stolen. The rule is generally applied where the accused is 
found in possession of the articles soon after they were 
stolen.'' [3] ''False or evasive answers to material questions 
with reference to the ownership of stolen property tend to 
prove such knowledge." (People v. Reynolds (1957), 149 
Cal.App.2d 290, 294 [2] [308 P.2d 48]; see also People v. 
Cole (1903), 141 Cal. 88, 90 [74 P. 547]; People v. Boinus 
(1957), 153 Cal.App.2d 618, 621-622 [1, 2, 3] [314 P.2d 787] ; 
People v. Malonf (1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 697, 707 [8, 9] [287 
P.2d 834] ; People v. Hartridge (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 659, 
665 [6] [286 P.2d 72]; People v. Boyclen (1953), 116 Cal. 
App.2d 278, 288 [12, 13, 14] [253 P.2d 773]; People v. Jacobs 
(1925), 73 Cal.App. 334, 339-343 [2, 3, 4] [238 P. 770].) 
[4] The jury could find that defendant's statement to the 
police officer, shortly after his arrest, that the watch "was 
his, that he had had it for some time" was a consciously 
evasive and misleading explanation. Under the authorities 
cited above this is sufficient to show a consciousness of guilt 
and justify an inference that defendant received the watch 
with knowledge that it was stolen. ( Cf. People v. Wayne 
(1953), 41 Cal.2d 814, 823 [ 4, 5] [264 P.2d 547].) It fol-
lows that such evidence tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense and satisfies the requirements 
of section 1111 of the Penal Code. (People v. Santo (1954), 
supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [9].) 
[5] As to the fur coat which is the subject of count 6 the 
jury eould find that defendant falsely stated "that he hadn't 
seen any fur coats, didn't know what I was talking about." 
The trier of fact was entitled to believe that defendant had 
the fur coat in his possession under suspicious circumstances, 
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yet, when questioned concerning that possession, offered no 
innocent explanation but rather falsely denied the fact of 
possession. Denial of possession of the goods, if such denial 
is shown to be false, is a persuasive circumstance tending to 
show guilty knowledge. (People v. Hartridge (1955), supra, 
134 Cal.App.2d 659, 665 [6]; People v. Boyden (1953), supra, 
116 Cal.App.2d 278, 288 [13].) 
[6] It is true that much of the evidence stated above was 
controverted. But, as stated in People v. Henderson (1949), 
34 Ca1.2d 340, 346-347 [6] [209 P.2d 785], "When as in the 
present record it is discovered that there is testimony aside 
from that of the accomplice which tends to connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the crime, the function of 
the appellate court is performed. Questions of the weight of 
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are for the 
trial court, and since the circumstances reasonably justify 
the finding of guilt, an opposing view that they also may be 
reconciled with innocence will not warrant interference with 
the judgment on appeal." Regardless of how we might think 
we would resolve the confliets if we were initially trying the 
issues of fact, our duty in the appellate function is clear. 
[7] This is true also as to uncertainties in Pope's testimony 
as to just when defendant was present when Pope delivered 
stolen property to Ferguson. (See People v. Daugherty 
(1953), 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [4, 5] [256 P.2d 911]; People v. 
Newland (1940), 15 Cal.2d 678, 680-684 [1] [104 P.2d 778], 
and eases cited.) 
Officer Roberts testified during the People's case in chief 
that when defendant and Ferguson went into the Crest Hotel 
"Mr. Lyons was carrying a cardboard box and Mr. Ferguson 
was carrying a blue handbag with the letters P AA on the 
side.'' Then in answer to the question, ''This blue bag that 
you say Lyons was carrying, did it appear to have anything 
in it?" the witness answered, "Yes, it was stuffed full." On 
rebuttal Officer Roberts corrected his testimony, stating that 
"Mr. Ijyons was carrying the blue bag with the P AA, and 
Mr. Ferguson the box.'' Defendant's counsel objected to 
this rebuttal testimony. He said, ''There is apparently a 
conflict, and that is why we had these witnesses excluded. 
[There was an order for exclusion of witnesses from the 
courtroom vvhen they were not testifying.] Now he is bringing 
him back in and the witness is changing his testimony.'' The 
court ruled, ''If the witness wants to explain any mistaken 
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statements made, made in error, he may do so at this time.'' 
On cross-examination on rebuttal Officer Roberts testified 
that on the night before his rebuttal testimony Officer Hooper 
called his attention ''to the mistake that was in the tran-
script.' 
[8] Defendant asserts that Officer Roberts "After admit-
ting that he had violated the trial court's order sequestering 
the witnesses, in that he had discussed his testimony with Sgt. 
Hooper, changed his testimony in this respect." The appraisal 
of the effect of this change in testimony on Officer Roberts' 
credibility was for the trier of fact. 
Defendant urged that the verdict of not guilty as to the 
conspiracy count was inconsistent with the verdicts of guilty 
as to counts 5 and 6 because among the overt acts charged 
in the conspiracy count were the possession by defendant of 
the articles which are the subjects of counts 5 and 6. 
[9] "[T]he overwhelming weight of authority is that the 
acquittal of a defendant of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
a crime is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution of said de-
fendant for the commission of said crime, even though said 
crime is alleged in the conspiracy indictment as the sole overt 
act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.'' (People v. 
JfacJi1dlen (1933), 218 Cal. 655, 656 [1] [24 P.2d 793]; 
People v. Lyon (1955), 135 CaLApp.2d 558, 586 [19] [288 
P.2d 57], and cases cited [conviction of conspiracy does not 
place defendant in double jeopardy when he is subsequently 
prosecuted for the main crime].) [10] It follows that 
acquittal of conspiracy here is not inconsistent with convic-
tion of substantive offenses of receiving stolen goods. De-
fendant could, in fact, be guilty of receiving stolen goods 
without having conspired to receive them. ( Cf. People v. 
Keyes (1930), 103 Cal.App. 624, 632, 646 [284 P. 1096].) 
On cross-examination of Officer Hooper defense counsel 
asked, "Now, how many times from the 8th of April, 1955, 
to this day have you talked to Mr. Pope 1" An objection that 
this was ''outside the scope of direct examination'' was sus-
tained. Defense counsel stated, "it is on the limited proposi-
tion of motive that I am offering it-bias, prejudice'' and 
the court replied, ''I think the ruling will stand.'' In his 
brief defendant asserts, ''That he [Officer Hooper] had con-
tacted the witness Pope an unusual number of times, wined 
and dined with him would go to show that prejudice.'' 
However, defense counsel did not make an offer of proof in 
the trial court that he was attempting to show an unusual 
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number or type of meetings between Hooper and Pope; 
defense counsel's question of Hooper might only have elicited 
the information that Hooper talked with Pope on a number 
of occasions in the ordinary course of his investigation. 
[11] .. Where the question does not show on its face whether 
or not it is material, the questioner, in order to claim error 
in sustaining an -Dbjection thereto, must reframe it or make 
offer of proof to show its materiality. (People v. Singh (1920), 
182 Cal. 457, 482 [19] [188 P. 987]; People v. Monson (1951), 
102 Cal.App.2d 308, 313 [6, 8] [227 P.2d 521]; People v. 
Fredecn (1950), 101 Cal.App.2d 105, 107 .. 108 [4] [224 P.2d 
849] ; People v. McDonald (1930), 110 Cal.App. 183, 187 [3] 
[293 P. 883]; see People v. Brown (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 
430, 433 [110 P.2d 1059].) 
Defendant's contention that the deputy district attorney 
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct is likewise without merit. 
In the course of his argument to the jury the deputy district 
attorney stated: ''Remember, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. 
Haley [an attorney who permitted Ferguson to store property 
on his premises] is not on trial here. Maybe th1:s is a good 
point to bring up right now, btlt it is not the ftmction of the 
District Attorney's office to go around recklessly indicting 
people and bringing charges against them. Our dut·ies are 
not to prosecute people just for the sake of making prosecu .. 
tions. It is our duty to protect the citizens of the County 
against crimes. 
"If the evidence disclosed that Mr. Haley actually had 
possession of that property, knowing it to be stolen, then the 
Grand Jury might have indicted Mr. Haley. But they did 
not. Do we have any evidence that Mr. Haley associated with 
Mr. Pope and Mr. Ferguson, as we have against Mr. Lyons? 
Do we have any evidence that Mr. Haley went to their homes, 
as we have against Mr. Lyons? Do we have any evidence that 
Mr. Haley acted as their mouthpiece, as we have against Mr. 
Lyons? If Mr. Haley was a party to a crime, proper govern .. 
mental agencies will take care of that, but right now we are 
concerned only with Mr. Lyons. And when they say, 'Here 
is another attorney who did all this. In other words, I am 
not the only person dipping my fingers into the till. Why 
don't you get these other people?' Well, he is the only one 
here on trial and we are not concerned with anyone else.'' 
(Italics added.) 
Although no objection was made at the trial, defendant now 
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contends that of the above statement 
constituted prejudicial misconduet in that it implied to the 
the deputy district attorney had extrajudicial 
of defendant's [12] As stated in People 
(1936), 6 Ca1.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136], "The 
rule regarding misconduct of the district attorney 
which tends to and is likely to result in prejudiee to the de-
fendant is that where no objection is made to sueh miseon-
duet the defendant, or where objection is made and the 
court sustains the objection and properly admonishes the jury, 
the misconduet claimed to be prejudicial to defendant's rights 
will not furnish grounds suffkieut to justify the g-ranting of 
a new trial or the reversal of the judgment. I Citation.] 
[13] 'J'here are two exceptions to this general rule. One is 
where the caRe is elosely balanced and there is grave doubt 
of defendant's guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as 
to eontribnte materially to the verdict, a misearriage of 
justice results requiring a reversal. [Citation.] The other 
exception is INhere the act done or remark made is of such a 
character that a harmful result cannot be obviated or cured 
by any retraction of counsel or instruction of the court. In 
such cases the misconduct will furnish ground for a reversal 
of the judgment, even where proper admonitions are given by 
the court. [Citations.]" [14] Whether a prosecutor has 
been guilty of prejudicial misconduct must be determined in 
the light of the particular factual situation involved. Previous 
authority is of little help. Suffice it to say that the conduct 
of the deputy district attorney here involved, did not ap-
proach the extraordinary misconduct revealed in such cases 
as People v. Kirkes (1952), 39 Cal.2d 719, 723-724 [1-4] [249 
P.2d 1]; People v. Vienne (1956), 142 Cal.App.2d 172, 173 
[2a] [297 P.2d 1027]; People v. Teixeira (1955), 136 Cal. 
App.2d 136, 147-148 [288 P.2d 535]; and People v. Talle 
(1952), 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 673-677 [8-12] [245 P.2d 633], 
cited by defendant. Nor is this a case such as People v. Hale 
(1947), 82 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [187 P.2d 121], where the 
trial court failed to sustain defendant's objections to the 
improper statements of the prosecuting attorney and made 
comments which tended to classify the prosecutor's remarks 
as a summation of the testimony and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom. 
[15] In the subject ease, just before making the above 
quoted remarks, the deputy district attorney posed the ques-
tion, "Why isn't Mr. Haley [a prosecution witness] in here 
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as a defendanU" This rhetorical question apparently related 
back to the fact that a defense attorney argued that "The 
only reason Mr. Haley is immunized is because he is putting 
Mr. Lyons in this case.'' The other defense counsel argued 
that "Mr. Haley said he did not know Mr. . .. Yet 
he had all this property . . . Mr. had he had 
it all in his house." Whether or not Mr. 
plice, the fact is that his was not Thus 
when considered in context the italicized portions of the prose-
cutor's remarks appear to fall within the scope of proper 
argument as an answer to the implications of defense counsel 
that Haley should have been prosecuted and to constitute 
an attempt to clarify for the jury matters which have 
confused them. (Of. People v. Perkin (1948), 87 CaLApp. 
2d 865, 867-869 [2] [ 197 P .2d 39 J.) Any inference to the 
ef!ect that the deputy district attorney had extrajudicial 
knowledge of the defendant's guilt is slight and was certainly 
susceptible to cure by admonition. 
The foregoing remarks are equally applicable to other 
statements, set out below, which defendant contends indi-
cated to the jury that the prosecutor had extrajudicial knowl-
edge of the defendant's guilt. 
[16] In his argument to the jury the district attorney 
also stated: "And there has been only the insinuation, the 
insinuation that all of the People's witnesses who were accom-
plices or in any way connected with the defendant, were 
allowed to plead guilty to only one or two Counts. Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, that is a matter, I believe, of common 
knowledge, that if there are three or four Counts against 
some defendant, that defendant is permitted to take a plea 
to one or more of the Counts. And even after three days of 
trial they allowed Mr. Moeckel to plead guilty to two Counts 
of Robbery. Why? It is obvious. In his sentence the Judge 
made the sentences run concurrently. Why him on two 
or three or four Counts when he can be found guilty on one 
Count, or when he pleads guilty to one or two Counts? 
The Judge made the sentences run concurrently. If we took 
a plea of two Counts against Pope and one Count against 
Mr. Ferguson, tke big reeeiver, we will offer Mr. Lyons tke 
same consideration. If at any time during tkis trial ke wanted 
to plead guilty to one Count, or if he would like to do so even 
now, we will give him tke same consideration. u (Italics 
added.) The court sustained defendant's objection to the 
italicized portion of the prosecutor's remarks and instructed 
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the jury "to disregard the statement of counsel regarding 
any offer to accept a plea from Mr. Lyons." Defendant now 
argues that the admonition was insufficient to cure the error. 
In the light of the circumstances indicated above, the conten-
tion is without merit. 
[17] In the concluding phase of his closing argument the 
deputy district attorney stated: ''And some of the jewelry 
is not in evidence. And the reason for that is because we 
could not show Mr. Lyons' connection with the other fur 
coats or with the other jewelry. The fur coat carried in this 
bag, ... and that is here, but the fnr coat carried by Mr. 
Ferguson in that cardboard box is not here because we can-
not show Mr. Lyons' connection with that fur coat. ... 
The reason the other furs are not here is because we could 
not connect Mr. Lyons with them." Defendant made no 
objection at the time but now contends the remarks implied 
to the jury that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of 
defendant's guilt. The contention is without merit. Defense 
counsel had earlier called the jury's attention to the fact that 
certain items referred to in the testimony had not been intro-
duced into evidence. The remarks of the deputy district 
attorney were a legitimate explanation to the jury why such 
items had not been introduced. Even if we should assume 
that the remarks were improper their substance cannot be said 
to have contributed materially to the verdict. 
[18] 'l'he deputy district attorney also argued as follows: 
"Btd it is evident, ladies and gentlemen, that if anyone 
wottld have been given considemtion by the Police Depart-
ment, it would have been the son of a former policeman. l'hey 
wmtld not discriminate against a pol1:ccman's son. On the con-
trary, it seems to me that they would have gone all out to 
give him every break poo;sible. 
"Mr. Cantillon [an attorney for the defendant] referred 
to 'Inspector Lyons' but I don't know what his father was. 
But I do know that the evidence has certainly shown the 
defendant is not a chip off the old block." (Italics added.) 
Defendant interposed no objection but now contends the 
italici11ed portion of the prose(~utor 's remarks amounted to 
an avowal of his personal belief in defendant's guilt. How-
ever the statements of the prose(•utor are a mere assertion 
of what he claimed was "evident" or that "the evidence has 
certainly shown,'' and were made in answer to defense coun-
sel's assertions to the effect that defendant had ineurred the 
wrath of the police department by bringing several suits 
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against its members and the police were out to "settle" 
defendant "once and for all." No error appears in this 
instance. 
[19] Defendant also urges that the deputy district attor-
ney committccd prejudicial misconduct by twice referring to 
the defendant as the "mouthpiece" for his accomplices. No 
objection was interposed at the trial. The term carries an 
unsavory connotation in the minds of many persons. Its use 
was improper and should not be condoned. However, under 
the facts of this case, it does not appear that any different 
verdict would have been probable had the deputy district 
attorney not used the term. It follows that its use is not 
ground for reversal. (People v. Watson (1956), 46 Cal.2d 
818, 835, 836 [12] [299 P.2d 243] .) 
[20] Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial 
in that the district attorney and superior court coerced the 
accomplices to testify untruthfully against him. This claim 
is not substantiated by the record. It does appear that the 
accomplices pleaded guilty to certain charges brought against 
them and that the court postponed their sentencing from time 
to time until after they had testified for the prosecution 
against defendant. 'l.'his fact was brought out upon cross-
examination and the prosecutor frankly admitted to the jury 
that "inducements" had been offered the accomplices for their 
testimony. 'l.'he ''inducements'' obviously were promises of 
reduced sentences. These facts go to the credibility, not the 
competency, of the accomplices' testimony. (People v. Pan-
tages (1931), 212 Cal. 237, 252-259 [8, 9, 10] [297 P. 890].) 
They furnish the defendant with a powerful weapon for 
attacking the credibility of the inherently suspect witnesses 
but since the jury were fully apprised of the facts and sec-
tion 1111 of the Penal Code was satisfied, we cannot hold 
that the trial is shown to have been unfair in fact or in law. 
[21] Defendant, however, urges that since the proffered 
leniency was obviously conditioned on the accomplices' first 
testifying against defendant, that testimony was worthless 
as a matter of law, relying primarily on People v. Green 
(1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 831 [228 P.2d 867], and cases therein 
discussed. But in that case the promise of immunity was 
conditioned on the accomplice's testimony resulting in the 
conviction of the defendant. The Green case recognizes, at 
page 838 of 102 Cal.App.2d, that, "It is a practice which 
seems to be approved in all jurisdictions, if the ends of justice 
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upon condition that he 
of the facts out of which the charge 
arose.'' There is nothing in the present case to indieate that 
the of were eouditioned on anything other 
and as to their 
of the facts out o£ which the arose. It 
follows that the 
Defendant relics upon the i:itatement in People v. vValihm· 
(1938), 27 Cal.App.2d 583, 591 [81 P.2d , that 
"\Vhen a codefendant who is a coconspirator has been offered 
immunity from prosecution in reward for his testimony, the 
cause should be promptly dismissed against him. Otherwise, 
the maintenance of the action against him throughout the 
trial may serve to intimidate the witness and furnish an 
inducement for him to color his testimony." vVe may assume 
that it would be better practice, lending credibility to the 
accomplices' testimony, to have promptly sentenced them, 
but we cannot believe that the failure so to do was so serious 
a matter that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. 
[22] Defemlant complains of ihc trial court's failure to sus-
tain his objection to, and to grant his motion to strike, the 
testimony of J oscph Kurrus, a proceRs server for the district 
attorney. Kurrus testified that he twice served a subpoena 
on Ernest Gallo, the person in whose room defPndant was 
arrested, to appear at the trial, and that he again attempted 
to serve him but could not find him. Gallo did not appear 
at the trial. The prosecuting attorney in argument said, "I 
would like to have had :M:r. Gallo here ... to clear up some 
of the inconsistencies in the defendant's story, but we have 
been unable to locate him, although we have tried diligently." 
Defendant argues that Kurrus' testimony was presented to 
confuse the jury and cast suspicion on defendant by an 
implication that Gallo's testimony would be favorable to the 
prosecution. Gallo's testimony would cleady have been ma-
terial. Although there is no showing that it would have been 
favorable to the prosceution, the prosecution was entitled to 
explain why Gallo was not produeed, to forestall any question 
which might arise in the minds of the jury as to why Gallo 
did not testify. (Sec People v. Clark (1895), 106 Cal. 32, 38 
[39 P. 53]; People v. Schunke (1934), 140 Cal.App. 544, 549 
[35 P.2d 388].) 
[23] Defendant complains that the trial court erred in 
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of Officer in rebuttal, by 
of a conversation from a transcript 
and him whether the conversation occurred. 'fo show 
that defendant made statements contrary to his 
the 
defendant: He was asked if he reealled on 
8, about p. m. in the presence of M:r Gallo 
and Off1eers 0 and Hooper 
that he did. Defendant was then asked if he 
portion of the conversation : "Mr. Gallo 
made a and after that O'Mara said to Gallo, 'Now, 
you told us tl1at he broug-ht them over to have you sell them 
for him.' And Gallo said, 'That's At first I thought 
the eoats were not stolen. In I clidn 't think were 
stolen because I didn't think he would be jeopardizing him-
self.' And you said, 'Of conrsr not.' And Gallo said, 'I didn't 
tell him where eame from. bec-ause I didn't know where 
they carne from.' And you said, 'I thought his laundry was 
in the box.' And Farquarson said, '\Vhose laundry?' And 
you said, 'Ferguson's laundry.' '' The only answer which 
defrndant gave to the above quotrd question was, "I never 
said 'Ferguson's laundry' at any time. Hooper said that." 
Defendant was askrcl if he rcr.:nlled tlw following por-
tion of the conyrrsation: '"l'hcm Gallo said: 'Don't try 
to put the blame on me,' and thrn Hooper said to you: 'Is 
this man nhout the whole affair, then?' ... You said: 
'Now, look, the man may have had thoughts about it, the man 
is not a liar, but I din not have a conversation 'IYith him about 
selling fun;.' " Drfendant answrrrd, "I did not say that, 
no. He [IIooprrJ called Mr. Gallo a damned liar at that 
time.'' 
On rebuttal, when Officer Hooper was testifying, the prose-
cuting attorney identified the foregoing conversation and 
asked, "During that conversation, sir. were the following 
questions asked and the following answers given--" 
Defense counsel objected on the ground "that that is leading 
and suggestive.'' The objection was overruled and the exam-
ination proceeded as follows: 
"Q. By MR. STOVITZ attomey J : lVIr. Lyons 
said, 'I thought his Ianmhy was in that box,' and Officer l<'ar-
quarson said, '\Vhose ?' And Mr. said, 'Fer-
guson's laundry.' 
"\Vere those questions ask0d and did Mr. I1yons say, 
'Ferguson's laundry~' A. Yes, he did. 
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"Q. During that conversation, sir, were the following ques-
tions asked and did Mr. Lyons make the following answers, 
Mr. Lyons made the statement, 'No, I don't recall hearing 
it,' and Gallo said, 'Don't try to put the blame on me.' 
And you said to Mr. Lyons, 'Is this man lying about this 
whole affair, then?' And Lyons said, 'Now, look. The man 
may have had thoughts about it. The man is not a liar, but 
I did not have a conversation with him about selling furs.' 
"MR. RICHARD CANTILLON [defense counsel]: That is ob-
jected to as improper cross-examination. 
"THE CouRT: It is rebuttal. 
"MR. STOVITZ: Yes, this is rebuttal, your Honor. I asked 
Mr. Lyons that question. 
"Q. Did Mr. Lyons make that statement at that time, 'No, 
now, look. The man may have had thoughts about it. The 
man is not a liar, but I did not have a conversation with him 
about selling furs.' 
"MR. CANTILLON: I will object to that, your Honor, on 
the ground it is leading and suggestive. I don't know why 
we just don't ask the officer what was said. He is reading 
from a transcript . . . and all he does is answer 'Yes' every 
time he asks him a question. . . . [This question was not 
answered.] 
'' Q. By MR. STOVITZ: Were the following questions asked 
and did Mr. Lyons give the following answers-you, Mr. 
Hooper, made the statement: 'The first you knew that he 
had more than one fur was when you saw this darker-colored 
fur1' 
"Mr. Gallo said: 'The following morning at my place.' 
''And you said: 'I see you are nodding your head, Mr. 
Lyons. Does that mean you are agreeing with the story~' 
"And Mr. Lyons said: 'No, no. We had a long conver-
sation that \Vednesday night. A discussion was had about 
many different subjects. I never had these two items in my 
possession at any time. We were just having a conversation. 
I never offered those for sale. Ferguson had them in the 
box. I don't know what Ferguson had.' 
"Vvas that statement made, sir? A. Yes, it was." 
"While the questioning was somewhat confusing, and the 
so-called rebuttal is not all strictly rebuttal, it is apparent that 
defendant could not have been prejudiced in this regard. 
[24] Officer 0 'Mara vms called on rebuttal and testified that 
the conversation in question was recorded and that the tran-
. script thereof from which the prosecuting attorney read ·as 
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above quoted was typed by a clerk in his presence. Without 
objection he testified affirmatively to the question whether 
defendant made the statement that he thought Ferguson's 
laundry was in the box. 
On cross-examination of 0 'Mara the following occurred: 
"Q. Can you tell me who drew a line through the name 
Lyons before the semi-colon and the words, 'I thought his 
laundry was in that box,' sir~ (Showing document to the 
witness.) Who drew this line straight through the middle of 
the word Lyons 1 A. I don't know. 
'' Q. Who wrote out in the paragraph opposite that state-
ment and apparently erased the word 'Gallo'~ A. I don't 
know. It is not my ·writing." 
Defendant complains that the transcript was altered. But 
there is nothing in the record which shows that the tran-
script was not altered to correct it so that it would reflect 
the truth. 
Further cross-examination of dcfenda11t from a transcript 
of his questioning by Officers Armstrong and Hooper and 
further cross-examination concerning the questioning of de-
fendant in Gallo's presence at 4 o'clock on April 8, could 
not have been error prejudicing defendant. 
[25] Defendant asserts that the prosecution wilfully sup-
pressed "vital finger print evidence." 'l'he factual basis of 
this contention is as follows: The accomplice Pope testified 
that he paid Ferguson a total of $100 for which Ferguson 
obtained a driver's license for Pope under the name "Robert 
Englund''; that Ferguson told Pope that ''a person who 
answered my general description'' had applied for the license; 
Pope believed that defendant was present during some of the 
conversations which led to the obtaining of the false license. 
The license was received in evidence at the request of defend-
ant but marked as a People's exhibit. Defendant called Offi-
cer Hooper to the stand and he answered negatively questions 
whether he had caused an examination of the thumb print 
and signature on the license to be made and whether he had 
any idea whose thumb print and handwriting appeared there-
on. To the question ''And as you sit there now you have no 
idea who wrote on that application 1" Officer Hooper testified, 
"No, I don't." The prosecuting attorney said, "That's 
objected to, your Honor, as being immaterial unless he has 
an idea as to who caused it. We all have an idea after listen-
ing to the evidence.'' The court ruled, ''Well, the answer 
may stand." 
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It is defendant's the 
evidence that the thumb 
that the attorney, 
an idea after listening to the 
thumb was that of defendant. This argument is mani-
without merit. No such appears from the 
prosecuting attorney's statement ''after to 
the evidence" it would appear that obtained the 
license for Pope on of an unidentified person 
"who answered [Pope ... general description." If de-
fendant thought that any implication arose that the thumb 
print was his, he was not prevented from offering evidence 
that it was not. 
As previously stated, Officer Hooper testified that when 
defendant was questioned about the watch he "said it was 
his, that he had had it for some time.'' Defendant testified 
that he did not make such a statement. [26] On defense 
counsel's cross-examination of Officer Hooper he testified that 
the interrogation of defendant was recorded but that he did 
not have a transcript of the conversation concerning the 
watch which is the subject of count 5. Asked whether the 
conversation concerning the watch was recorded, Hooper 
answered, "No, I don't know whether that portion was 
recorded or not." Defendant argues that "it was manifest 
injustice for the police, and District Attorney, to suppress 
this recording. Obviously, a play-through of it would have 
exonerated the Appellant, and supported his statement that 
he made no such utterance .... It is inherently improbable 
that this part of the supposed recordation was not made .... 
If there was a record, it should have been produced and played 
for the jury." 
There is nothing in the record to support defendant's as-
sertions that this portion of the conversation was recorded 
and the recording suppressed. The conversation occurred im-
mediately after defendant was taken to the office of the police, 
and it may well have been that the recording of defendant's 
questioning had not commenced. In the absence of some 
factual support therefor, defendant's charge that a tape re-
cording was deliberately suppressed is not ·well taken. 
[27] Defendant complains that the jury were not in-
structed that private transactions are presumed to be fair 
and regular (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963. subd. 19) and that the 
court "gave no instruction embodying the principle that a 
defendant is presumed to speak the truth and that unless 
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defendant any such 
that although there 
was abundant evidence by defendant concerning 
his to the persou;; eom1eeted with the ease the 
court gave no instrudion at all the standard to be 
the in defendant's 
It is true that there was no instruetion spec-ifically directed 
to defendant's explanation of events as to that of 
any other witness. But the court instrueted the jury at length 
concerning the apprai.~al of the of ·witnesses. Among 
other things the jury were told that ''A witness is presumed 
to speak the truth. This presumption, however, may be re-
pelled by the manner in which he testifies; his interest in the 
case, if any, or his bias or prejudice, if any, for or against 
any of the parties; by the charaeter of his testimony, ... or 
by contradictory evidence." 
[28] ''It has been repeatedly held to be improper for the 
court to single out a partieular witness and to charge the jury 
how l1is evidence should be eonsidcred. [Citations.]" (People 
v. McDannel (1949), fl4 Cal.App.2d 88!J [5} [211 P.2d 
910]; aeeord, People v. Emmett (1932), 123 Cal.App. 678, 
683 l7] [12 P.2d 92]; PeozJlc v. Quon Poo (1922), 57 Cal.App. 
237,241 [6] l206 P. 1028].) 
[29] Defeudant's requested and refused instruction that 
'"£he fact that an indictment has been filed ... is not to be 
considered by you . . . on the proposition of the guilt or 
innocenee of this dcfendaut '' and that the plea of not guilty 
raises the pr0sumption of inuw:cnee, was covered by other, 
more aeeurate instruetions. 
[30] Defeudant complaim; of the r·efnsal of the following 
instruetion: '' \Vhere the Distriet A Horney has arbitrarily 
seleeted one or more alleged co-conspirators to whom he has 
tell(lerecl immunity from proseet!lion in reward for his [turn-
ing] State's evidence against his allrgwl eollrgtw, such evi-
dence is open to snsnieion, and nlH1er Rneh eiremnsianees the 
testinwn.\' of an allPg:rd should be examined 
with great care." The snbsht11ce of this instrnetion was 
eovc'rerl b)' the following instrnetions '''hieh were giYen: 
" [T-p1e testimony of an aceornplire ought to be viewed 
with distrust. 'L'his does not mc'an that you may arbitrarily 
disregard such testimony, but you should to it the weig·ht 
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to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care 
and caution and in the light of all the eYidence in the case." 
The presumption that a witness speaks the truth "may be 
repelled by ... his interest in the case, if any, or his bias 
or prejudic8, if any, for or against any of the parties .... '' 
[31a] Defendant complains that the trial court did not of 
its own motion instruet the jury that "the alleged admission 
of the defendant could not itself be used to establish guilt, 
nor <:onld suc:h admi~sion lJe used. unless the eorpus delicti of 
the crime charged be imlependently proved.'' Defendant cites 
People v. Fl'ey (1!H3), 165 Cal. 140, 147 [131 P. 127], where 
it was held error for the court to fail to instruct as to "the 
true rule w.ith reference to the admission of confessions and 
the necessity for independent proof of the corpus delicti." 
But it has been held that failure to instruct that proof in-
dependent of the extrajudicial statements of defendant is 
necessary to prove the corpus delicti, although error, is not 
reversible where there was evidence independent of such 
statements. (People v. Clark (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 134, 141 
[4] [255 P.2d 7D]; People v. Chan Chaun (1940), 41 Cal.App. 
2d G8G, 5D2 [8] [107 P.2d 455].) 
[32] The uncorroborated tc"stimony of the accomplices was 
sufficient to estalJlish the corpus delieti. (People v. Pearson 
(193D), 111 Cal.App.2d 9, 28 [37] [244 P.2d 35]; People v. 
Snyder (1925), 74 Cal.App. 1:l8, 148-144 [5] [239 P. 70G].) 
[31b] \Ve are satisfied that in the cireumstances of this case 
the failure of the court, of its own motion, to give the subject 
instruction was not prejudieial error. 
[33] Defendant complains that without the request of 
the jury armed guards took the exhibits, including the al-
legedly stolen property, into the jury room; that this was 
an improper influenC'e on the jury whieh unfairly induced 
them to believe that the property was stolen. The only sup-
port in the record for this argument is the following entry in 
the clerk's minutes: "the jury retires for its deliberations. 
·without the presence of the jury, and with defendant and 
his eounscl and the Deputy District Attorney present, de-
fendant objeets to jury haYing the exhibits with them and 
moves that the exhibits be withdrawn from the jury under 
PC 11:37. The motion is denied and all exhibits that are ad-
mitted in eviden('e are permitted to be taken by the jury to 
the jury room.'' 
Section 1187 of the Penal Code provides, "Upon retiring 
for deliberation, the jury may take with them all papers (ex-
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cept depositions) which have been received as evidence in the 
cause, or copies of such public records or private documents 
given in evidence as ought not, in the opinion of the court, 
to be taken from the person having them in possession. . . . '' 
Defendant concedes that the jury may also take clothing which 
had been introduced in evidence into the jury room (citing 
People v. Hower (1907), 151 Cal. 638, 645-646 [91 P. 507] ; 
People v. Mahoney (1888), 77 Cal. 529, 531-532 [20 P. 73]). 
In People v. Van Skancler ( 1937), 20 Cal.App.2d 248, 255-
256 [8] [66 P.2d 1228], the prosecuting attorney, during 
argument, handed exhibits to the jury without request and 
told them that they could take the exhibits into the jury room 
with them. Defendant's contention that there was error in 
handing exhibits to the jury without their requesting them 
was rejected. In People v. Morales (1943), 60 Cal.App.2d 
196, 198 [2] [140 P.2d 461], the clerk, without the jury 
having made any request for exhibits, handed them to the 
jury. Defendant contended that it was error for this to have 
been done without a specific request by the jury. The appel-
late court says, ''Assuming, but not holding, that any error 
appears no prejudice is shown and any possible error in this 
regard would not justify a reversal." 
Here, assuming that the exhibits were taken into the jury 
room by "armed guards" without request by the jury, we 
are not prepared to hold that such conduct was error. It does 
not appear that such conduct could exert any improper in-
fluence on the jury, or could influence them to believe that 
the assertedly stolen exhibits were in fact stolen. 
[34] Defendant contends that his motion for a severance 
of his trial from that of Pope should have been granted. He 
complains that the number of challenges to the jury was 
limited and that the psychological effect of Pope's arising 
from the defense end of the counsel table and testifying 
against defendant was damaging to defendant. There is no 
showing that defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges 
to the jury. Therefore, it does not appear that he was prej-
udiced in this regard. (See People v. Griffin (1950), 98 Cal. 
App.2d 1, 49 [25] [219 P.2d 519].) [35] Nor do we be-
lieve that defendant was prejudiced by the fact that Pope 
sat at the defense end of the counsel table before trstifying 
against drfendant. It should be noted that if defendant and 
Pope had been tried separately Pope could have testified 
against defendant. (People v. Burdg ( 1928), 95 Cal.App. 
259, 268 [6] [272 P. 816].) 
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[36] Defendant asserts that there was a fatal variance 
between the pleading of count 6 of the indictment and the 
proof in that the proof established that defendant was guilty 
of burglary as a conspirator rather than of receiving stolen 
property. Defendant relies upon the Texas law that if there 
pursuant to which a thief steals and delivers 
..-.~"n.""''" to defendant, and there remains some act to be done 
by defendant with the property pursuant to the common de-
sign, defendant is as a thief and cannot be convicted 
of receiving stolen property. (Evans v. State (1948), 152 
Tex.Crim.Rep. 58 [211 S.W.2d 207, 209 [6]] ; Mcinnis v. 
State (1932), 122 Tex.Crim.Rep. 128 [54 S.W.2d 96, 98 [2, 
3]]; Byrd v. State (1931), 117 Tex.Crim.Rep. 489 [38 S.W.2d 
332, 333-334].) It is defendant's position that the testimony 
of the accomplices shows that defendant was a member of a 
conspiracy to commit the burglaries, was liable as a burglar, 
and therefore could not commit the crime of receiving stolen 
property from himself. The jury's verdict on its face suffi-
ciently resolves this argument against defendant. Defendant 
was found not guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary and 
to receive stolen goods. This interpretation of the evidence 
was permissible. Defendant could be found guilty as a re-
ceiver not pursuant to a prearranged plan but as a transaction 
independent of the burglary. [37] And on the other hand, 
if we assume that defendant and the accomplices agreed in 
advance that the accomplices should steal the property and 
defendant would receive it, the legal effect of such conspiracy 
would not be to exonerate any of its participants from any 
crime committed pursuant to the agreement but, rather, would 
support a holding that all ''are accomplices in the offense or 
offenses resulting from execution of such plan." (People v. 
Lima (1944), 25 Cal.2d 573, 577 [2], 578 [3] [154 P.2d 698].) 
Defendant urges that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant him a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evi-
dence contained in the affidavit of one Robert Erwin Morgan. 
Morgan, an inmate of Folsom, made the following averments: 
Officer Hooper approached him while he was in the county 
jail. Morgan had left a fur coat with defendant as a part 
payment of a retainer for legal services and was "hot" at 
defendant because defendant refused to return the coat. 
Hooper said, "we are led to believe that if any man could 
sack him [defendant J up you could do it .... Would you be 
willing to say that you had given a stolen mink coat to 
Lyons?'' Morgan answered, ''I couldn't do that because the 
coat was not stolen." When Morgan insisted that "I could 
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another man in '' Officer Armstrong, who 
was also "\Vise guys like you belong in Folsom 
and God I'll see that end up there and for your in-
formation I'll have jail with you \vi thin twenty-four 
hours and then you can both go to Folsom togethE-r." 
Affidavits of defendant and his counsel to the effect that 
the evidence was newly discovered and could not 
have been obtained by reasonable at the time of trial 
were presented. 
An affidavit of Officer Hooper contradidiug Morgan's affi-
davit was filed. 
[38] It has been held that "On a motion for a new trial, 
where conflicting affidavits are :filed, the question of fact is 
one for the determination of the trial judge and his determi-
nation will not be disturbed upon appeal if there is sub-
stantial evidence, as there was in the instant case, to sus-
tain his :finding." (People v. Young (1938), 26 CaLApp.2d 
700, 703 [4] [80 P.2d 138]; see also People v. Kawasaki 
(1913), 23 Cal.App. 92, 99 [137 I'. 287].) [39] Further-
more, it does not appear reasonably probable that this evi-
dence, cumulative and impeaching, would have caused the jury 
to reach a different conclusion regarding the guilt of defend-
ant. (People v. Peyton (1941), 47 Cal.App.2d 214, 224 [8] 
[117 P.2d 683].) 
[ 40] Defendant meritoriously contends that the receipt 
by him of the two items of property which are, respectively, the 
subjects of counts 5 and 6, constituted only one criminal trans-
action and that therefore he should not have been sentenced 
on two counts. The evidence of the accomplices shows that 
defendant originally received the watch and the fur coat on 
a single occasion. Therefore, but one offense of receiving 
stolen property is shown, although the goods were stolen 
from different sources, and the duality of the sentences, even 
though they are ordered to run concurrently, cannot be per-
mitted to stand. (People v. Smith (1945), 26 Cal.2d 854, 
858-859 [4-7] [161 P.2d 941]; People v. Roberts (1953), 40 
CaL2d 483, 491 [15-16] [254 P.2d 501].) 
[41] In a situation such as this, if any substantial objec-
tive of justice would be served thereby, this court could re-
verse the judgments as to both counts 5 and 6, order such 
counts consolidated, and remand the cause for rearraignment 
of the defendant for sentence and for sentence on the con-
solidated count. Inasmuch, however, as it does not appear 
that here either the state or the defendant will be prejudiced 
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by a simple reversal as to one count and affirmance as to the 
other, and as finality of adjudication will thereby be ex-
pedited, we conclude that the latter procedure is the more 
desirable. 
For the reasons above stated the judgment based on count 
6 is reversed and the judgment based on count 5 and the order 
denying a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree that there was 
sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony as re-
quired by section 1111 of the Penal Code. Insofar as the 
watch (count 5) is concerned, we see that there was only 
defendant's reply that he had had the watch for some time 
whereas, in reality, he had received it the night before from 
Dann Rio as, according to defendant, partial payment for 
attorney fees. There is no evidence in the record to show that 
defendant knew of the stolen character of the watch as 
required by section 496, subdivision 1 of the Penal Code. 
People v. Lopez, 126 Cal.App.2d 274 [271 P.2d 874], relied 
upon by the majority, was a case with an entirely different 
factual situation. In the Lopez case, the defendant made 
several different answers concerning his possession of stolen 
property. In the case at bar we have only defendant's state-
ment that he had had the watch for some time. There is 
nothing to contradict his statement that it was given to him 
by Rio in part payment of attorney fees, and absolutely 
nothing to show that he knew of the stolen character of the 
watch. 
With respect to the fur coat (count 6), the record shows 
that two of defendant's soiled shirts were in the P AA bag 
with the fur coat; that the bag was in the same room where 
defendant was found with the accomplices. The testimony 
concerning defendant's possession of the bag containing the 
fur coat is extremely dubious. The first witness testified that 
the accomplice had been carrying the blue bag marked with 
the letters P AA; thereafter the witness was contacted by 
Officer Hooper, although there had been an order sequestering 
witnesses, and changed his testimony so that it then showed 
that defendant had been carrying the P AA bag which con-
tained the fur coat. The only testimony in the record showing 
defendant might have had knowledge of the stolen character 
of the coat was that of accomplices. 
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It should be noted that practically all of the lengthy sum-
mations of the evidence in the majority opinion consist of 
various transactions between the accompliees conrerning fur 
coats and jewelry with the theft or receipt of which defendant 
was not charged. All of the a1lrg:ed conversations whi(oh would 
tend to show defendant's knowledge that the fur and wateh 
were stolen were testified to by accomplices and such testi-
mony was not corroborated. 'l'he faet that defendant was 
present in the room where the fur coat was found is surely 
not such corroboration as that called for by section 1111 of 
the Penal Code where it is drc-lared "and the corroboration 
is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense 
or the circumstances thereof .... " It appears to me that the 
so-called corroborating evidence requires "interpretation and 
direction from the testimony of the accomplice'' in order 
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime 
charged. 
I find no substantiation in the record for the conclusion 
reached by the majority that the defendant "received the 
watch and fur coat on a single occasion," and that there was 
but one offense involved. Defendant received the watch on 
the night of April 7th. The only testimony linking him, even 
in the slightest degree, to the fur coat was concerning events 
on the 8th of April. There is nothing whatsoever to show that 
the watch and fur coat constituted a single occasion or part 
of a single offense. The majority opinion in its endeavor to 
show that there was corroboration of the accomplice testimony 
has this to say: "To show that there is inculpatory evidence 
apart from the testimony of the accomplices we first set forth 
a summary of such inculpatory evidence. Defendant himself 
testified as follows: He was a lawyer with practice largely 
in the field of criminal law. He represented Ferguson [an 
accomplice], who was charged in a federal case 'Nith conspir-
acy [etc.] ... " It is apparent that the majority consider 
the fact that defendant represented criminals as corroborating 
evidence of the accomplice testimony. This is, of course, an-
other instance where guilt by association is used to establish 
the fact of the crime charged. It is also the first case where, 
to my knowledge, an attorney who represents a person accused 
of crime has been considered as either an accomplice or as a 
principal to the crime charged. But here we have defendant's 
representation of the accomplices considered as "inculpatory 
evidence.'' 
As the court held in People v. Re1:ngolcl, 87 Cal.App.2d 382, 
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"'While it is true that the corroborative 
tends to connect the defend-
although it is slight, 
to but little consider-
established in our law 
n10re. 
to in the erime raises no 
of guilt and is immffieient corroboration 
v. Braun, :n 593, 601 P.2d 728]); 
assoeiation with the actual perpetrators of the erime also gives 
rise only to a suspicion of guilt that he encouraged 
and participated in the crime and is insuffieient corroboration 
(People v. Bra1ln, 31 Cal.App.2d 593, 601 [88 P.2d 728] ; 
People v. Long, 7 Ca1.App. 27 [93 P. 387]; v. Koening, 
99 Cal. 574 [34 P. 238]; Prople v. Fagan, 98 Cal. 230 [33 P. 
60]). In People v. 109 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [ 240 P.2d 
327], the eourt said: 'l'hat while conflicting statements may 
tend to discredit the witness "they are not evidenl'e of the 
fact'' in issue. 
·when defendant sought to show Officer Hooper's bias and 
prejudice by cross-examiuing him as to the number of times 
he had contacted Pope, an original codefendant, conspirator, 
and witness for the prosecution, the proposed line of question-
ing was prohibited the trial court. .Although the scope 
of cross-examination is largely within the discretion of the 
trial court, a considerable latitude should he allowed to 
show the witness' state of mind and possible bias. (People v. 
W'inston, 46 Cal.2d 151, 157 [293 P.2d 40] ; People v. Pan-
tages, 212 Cal. 237, 255 [297 P. 890] ; People v. Evans, 113 
Cal.App.2d 124, 127 [247 P.2d 915] .) Under the peculiar 
facts of this ease it appears to me that defendant should 
have been permitted to (1uestion Hooper as to the number of 
times he had been ·with Pope. It will be recalled that the 
People dismissed the charges against Pope (after the com-
mencement of the trial) who then became a witness for the 
People. Inasmuch as there is only Offleer Hooper's state-
ment concerning defendant's reply when asked about the 
watch, his statement to defendant about an "anti-police" 
feeling, and the fact that he contacted Officer Roberts about 
the "mistake" in his testimony eonceru ing defendant's pos-
session of the blue bag, marked PAA, it appears to me that 
the defendant should have been permitted wide latitude in 
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to show bias and prejudice 
against the ·when it is considered that the cor-
roborative evidence as to the watch consisted entirely of 
Officer Hooper's statement, it becomes immediately apparent 
that the jury was entitled to have before it any available 
evidence on the matter of bias and prejudice. 
It is argued that it was prejudicial error for the People 
to make the following statement in that it left the inference 
with the that the prosecution had personal knowledge of 
the gnilt of the defendant: "Maybe this is a good point to 
bring up right now, but it is not the function of the District 
Attorney's office to go around recklessly indicting people 
and bringing charges against them. Our duties are not to 
prosecute people just for the sake of making prosecutions. 
It is our duty to protect the citizens of this County against 
crimes." There was no objection by defense counsel and no 
request at the time for an instruction admonishing the jury, 
although an instruction was given to the effect that statements 
of counsel did not constitute evidence in the case. A case some-
what similar is People v. Hale, 82 Cal.App.2d 827 [187 P.2d 
121], where the district attorney in his argument to the jury 
referred to the fact that the grand jury had indicted the 
defendants ''on the theory that both defendants were guilty 
... " and after objection by defense eounsel which was over-
ruled by the court, the district attorney concluded with this 
statement: ''That is why I say the grand jury was right when 
they indicted both of them.'' The court in the Hale case held 
that as to one defendant where the evidence of guilt was 
"much weaker" the remarks of the district attorney consti-
tuted prejudicial and reversible error. It appears that even 
had there been a request for an admonition at this time the 
error would not have been cured. The quoted remark assumes 
the guilt of the defendant and was highly prejudieial under 
the facts of the case. (People v. Hale, 82 Cal.App.2d 827 
[187 P.2d 121]; People v. Berryman, 6 Ca1.2d 331 [57 P.2d 
136]; People v. Vienne, 142 Cai.App.2d 172 [297 P.2d 1027]; 
People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 676 [245 P.2d 633].) 
Another instance of misconduct on the part of the district 
attorney which appears to have been highly inflammatory and 
prejudicial is the following statement made during closing 
argument: ''And there has been only the insinuation, the 
insinuation that all of the People's witnesses who were accom-
plices or in any way connected with defendant, were allowed 
to plead guilty to only one or two Counts. Ladies and gentle-
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men of the jury, that is a matter, I believe, of common 
knowledge, that if there are three or four Counts against 
some defendant, that defendant is permitted to take a plea 
to one or more of the Counts. And even after three days of 
trial they allowed Mr. Moeckel to plead guilty to two Counts 
of Robbery. \Vhy ~ It is obvious. In his sentence the 
Judge made the sentences run concurrently. \Vhy try him 
on two or three of four Counts when he can be found guilty 
on one Count or when he pleads guilty to one or two Counts~ 
The Judge made the sentences run concurrently. If we took 
a plea of two Counts against Pope and one Cmmt against Mr. 
Ji'ergnson, the big receiver, we will offer JJir. Lyons the same 
considemtion. If at any time during this trial he wanted to 
plead gtl·ilty to one Cmmt, or if he would like to do so even 
now, we will give him the same consideration." ~~n objection 
by defense counsel was sustained and the jury was admonished 
to disregard the remark. Defendant argues that no admoni-
tion could have cured the error inasmuch as it stressed his 
association with others who had pleaded guilty to the very 
charges for which he was on trial. In my opinion, defendant's 
argument is well tall:en and the remark constituted prejudicial 
misconduct on the part of the district attorney. (People v. 
Kirlces, 39 Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1] ; People v. Teixeira, 136 
Cal.App.2d 136 [288 P.2d 535]; People v. Bell, 138 Cal.App. 
2d 7 [291 P.2d 150] .) 
In another instance it appears that the district attorney, 
in his argument to the jury, committed misconduct : ''And 
some of the jewelry is not in evidence. And the reason for 
that is because \Ye could not show Mr. I1yons' connection 
with the other fur coats or with the other jewelry. The fur 
coat carried in this bag, Exhibit 18 [the bag], was the ermine 
coat, and that is here, but the fur coat carried by Mr. Fergu-
son in that cardboard box is not here because we can not show 
Mr. Lyons' connection with that fur coat." It will be recalled 
that whether defendant carried the blue bag containing the 
fur coat was a very close issue of fact in the case. This 
statement assumes that the defendant was carrying the bag 
and that his guilt had been established. While there was no 
request for an admonition, it appears that in this instance, 
as in the preceding ones, an admonition would not have cured 
the highly prejudicial effect created by the district attorney 
in assuming personal knowledge of defendant's guilt. 
Another instance of claimed prejudicial misconduct is the 
district attorney's reference to the defendant as the ''mouth-
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piece" for the defendants who had pleaded guilty and whom 
he had represented and was to represent in other criminal 
matters. Defendant argues that this was an unwarranted 
attack upon his character since the term carries with it an 
unsavory connotation. It is my opinion that defendant's 
claim that the term carries an unsavory connotation is well 
taken. It also appears that the use of the term was unneces-
sary and that the prosecution should not indulge in defama-
tory remarks concerning the defendant in any criminal case 
and that the practice should not be condoned by this court. 
Standing alone it may not have prejudiced the jury unduly 
but taken together with the other errors in the case it is diffi-
cult to determine just what effect the use of the term may 
have had. 
Defendant argues that he was denied due process of law in 
that the sentencing of Pope, Ferguson, and Rio was continued 
from time to time due to continuances in his case; that such 
postponement of imposing sentences on these accomplices until 
after the time defendant had been sentenced constituted intim-
idation and coercion of these witnesses against him. The 
district attorney admitted that ''inducements'' had been ex-
tended: ''Counsel said there were inducements for Pope, 
Ferguson and Rio to testify, and I would be trying to fool 
you if I said there was not, ladies and gentlemen. The 
plain, ordinary, hard facts in this case are that we had to 
offer some inducements to Pope, Rio and Ferguson to testify. 
But were they given complete immunity1 No. Have they 
been given lesser sentences? No. They were treated like 
every other criminal or any other person charged with a 
crime. Rio was given a year in the county jail as a condition 
of probation. That was apparently his first offense. He was 
sentenced before he testified here, ladies and gentlemen. He 
had nothing to gain and nothing to lose when he testified 
here. 
"MR. JAMES CANTIIJLON [attorney for defendant]: I object 
to that your Honor. There was testimony that the sentence 
to the burglary charge is still hanging over his head. 
''THE CouRT: That has been argued pro and con, of course. 
You may continue. 
"MR. STOVITZ: How else would we get any testimony here, 
ladies and gentlemen, other than by the testimony of the ac-
complices? These men who will have to live in confinement, 
who will have to fear the ostracism that comes with being a 
stool pigeon, how can you get these men to testify? We have 
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to say to we will tell the Judge you cooperated 
in this case.' But are you going to say that the Judge is 
corrupt when he takes a defendant's cooperation into consid-
eration f I don't think you can say that. I think the District 
Attorney's office has done its job here, and I think the Police 
Department has done its job, and I think the judges have done 
their job, and that is to protect you, ladies and gentlemen.'' 
Pope, admittedly guilty of burglary, was sentenced to one 
year in the county jail and the remaining counts against him 
were dismissed; Rio, also admittedly guilty of burglary, was 
sentenced to a year in the county jaiL ·what sentence was 
imposed on Ferguson does not appear, although the district 
attorney stipulated as follows with defense counsel: ''His 
[Ferguson's] plea of guilty was entered on May 10, 1955, 
and the time for the sentence has been contintted from time 
to time due to coniintwnces granted in the Lyons case." (Em-
phasis added.) 
In People v. Walther, 27 Cal.App.2d 583, 591 [81 P.2d 452], 
the court said: "When a codefendant who is a coconspirator 
has been offered immunity from prosecution in reward for his 
testimony, the cause should be promptly dismissed against 
him. Otherwise, the maintenance of the action against him 
throughout the trial may serve to intimidate the witness and 
furnish an inducement for him to color his testimony. More-
over, retaining a person as a party defendant throughout the 
trial, who has been promised immunity from prosecution in 
reward for his evidence may become a mere subterfuge to 
avoid the necessity of adhering to the established rule that the 
fact of the existence of a conspiracy may not be proved by the 
admissions of a coconspirator." It appears to me that the 
same rule should apply to sentencing accomplices who have 
pleaded guilty, in that refraining to do so until they have testi-
fied against one accused with them of conspiring, may very 
well color their testimony in the hope that the sentence im-
posed on them will be commensurate with the cooperation 
given by them to the prosecution. The People argue that there 
was not the slightest evidence that any leniency would be 
extended to these witnesses "only if their testimony resulted 
in the conviction of the appellant .... " It would appear from 
the district attorney's statement to the jury (heretofore 
quoted) that these witnesses had been promised "induce-
ments'' is sufficient to show that lenience had been promised 
them for their testimony against defendant. In People v. 
Green, 102 Cal.App.2d 831, 839 [228 P.2d 867], a witness had 
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been promised if he would testimony which 
would result in another being bound over for triaL The court 
held that ''A miscarriage of justice was oe<:'asioncd through the 
use by the State of testimony which, because of the condition 
upon which immunity depended, was impure, dubious and 
'tainted beyond redemption.' " 'l'he majority holds here 
that no such condition existed in the case at bar and that no 
reversible error is shown. While the admitted "indueements" 
undoubtedly eonsisted of leniency in sentencing the aecom-
pliees, it appears that the delay in senteneing thE' accompliees 
until defendant's trial was cone luded was "in its practical 
and legal effect, indistinguishable from a threat." (People v. 
Green, S1lpra, at p. 838.) 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment 
and order denying a new trial. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 27, 
1958. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L.A. No. 24596. In Bank. May 9, 1958.] 
Estate of EDWARD L. LBDBET'l'EH, Deceased. MAHK 
WOOD, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v. ,TOHN D. 
LUTON, as Guardian, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Orders--Conclusiveness: Appeal-Appeal-
able Orders.-An order instructing the administrator of a 
decedent's estate to sign a stipulation in settle1uent of the 
estate's claim against the United StntPs for damages and to 
concl.ude the settlement was appenlnhle (Proh. Code, ~ 1240), 
and where no appeal was taken tlwt order became final. 
[2] !d.-Compensation of Attorneys-Mode of Allowance.-Prob. 
Code, § 911, providing that an "attomey [for the] ... adminis-
trator ... may apply to the court for an allowance upon his 
fees" and the "court shall make an order requiring the ... 
administrator to pay such attorney out of the estate such com-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, §§ 79, 89; 
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 490. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 904 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 1118, 1129; 
[2] Decedents' Estates, § 862; [3] Decedents' Estates, §§ 151.1, 
886. 
